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This Article explains and defends that claim, and then suggests what the Court might do to ameliorate the effects
of its past mistakes without overruling a raft of settled precedents.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 992
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT .............................................................. 994
II. CONGRESS WEIGHS IN ON THE REGULATION OF ALIENS................. 997
III. THE SUPREME COURT TAKES OVER ............................................. 1000
IV. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE ALTERNATIVE TO THE INHERENT
POWER THEORY .......................................................................... 1008
V. WHAT NOW? ...................................................................................... 1011
A. Sanctuaries ............................................................................... 1014
B. Anti-Sanctuaries ........................................................................ 1017
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 1023

*

University Professor, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University. For helpful
comments, I am grateful to Helen Alvaré, Josh Blackman, Stephen G. Gilles, Jack G. Lund, Mara
S. Lund, John O. McGinnis, Christopher Mufarrige, and Ilya Somin.

991

992

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 21:4

INTRODUCTION
Immigration law is notoriously complex and controversial. In the
political arena, there could hardly be a wider range of policy views. Donald
Trump, for example, has advocated the deportation of millions of people
who came here illegally,1 many of whom have presumably been productive
and law-abiding residents for years, or even decades. Hillary Clinton, who
opposed him in the last election, was accused of favoring the diametrically
opposite position of “open borders.”2 That does not appear to be her
current position,3 but other politicians advocate policies that would come
close to effectively opening the borders.4 Perhaps reflecting the political
salience of the issues, academics who have chosen to immerse themselves in
1

2

3

4

See, e.g., Benjy Sarlin, Trump Recommits to Mass Deportation in Fiery Immigration Speech, NBC NEWS
(Sept. 1, 2016, 8:20 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/trump-recommitsmass-deportation-fiery-immigration-speech-n641016. Trump’s statements about this issue have
varied from time to time, but he pretty consistently favored mass deportation policies during his
presidential campaign.
In a speech to a private audience in South America, which was disclosed by WikiLeaks, Clinton
said: “My dream is a hemispheric common market, with open trade and open borders, some time
in the future with energy that is as green and sustainable as we can get it, powering growth and
opportunity for every person in the hemisphere.” What Hillary Clinton Really Said About ‘Open
Borders,’ THINKPROGRESS (Oct. 20, 2016, 1:47 AM), https://thinkprogress.org/what-hillaryclinton-really-said-about-open-borders-9c005c2b6d16/. After this quote was leaked, Clinton
claimed that she was referring only to cross-border trade in energy. This would seem to dissolve
the distinction that everyone else makes between free trade and the open borders that exist within
the United States and the European Union. Moreover, the structure of the sentence pretty
clearly implies that green energy is a distinct part of the dream, not the sole feature of a
“hemispheric common market.” Clinton has refused to release a full transcript of the speech,
which might have resolved whatever ambiguity can be found in the leaked quotation.
See Patrick Wintour, Hillary Clinton: Europe Must Curb Immigration to Stop Rightwing Populists,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 22, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/22/
hillary-clinton-europe-must-curb-immigration-stop-populists-trump-brexit (“I admire the very
generous and compassionate approaches that were taken particularly by leaders like Angela
Merkel, but I think it is fair to say Europe has done its part, and must send a very clear message—
‘we are not going to be able to continue provide refuge and support’—because if we don’t deal
with the migration issue it will continue to roil the body politic.”).
See, e.g., Press Release, Mark Pocan, U.S. Representative, House of Representatives, Members of
Congress Introduce Legislation to Terminate ICE and Transfer Critical Functions to Other
Agencies (July 12, 2018), https://pocan.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/members-ofcongress-introduce-legislation-to-terminate-ice-and-transfer (advocating abolition of the federal
agency responsible for investigations of immigration violations, apparently because it has not
focused exclusively on “hardened criminals, gangs and terrorists”); Roque Planas, It’s Time to
Decriminalize Immigration, Say Top Texas Dems, HUFFPOST, (Aug. 23, 2018, 2:17 PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/time-to-decriminalize-immigration-top-texasdemocrats_us_5b7c3985e4b0348585fb0db5?ylo. The policy that Hillary Clinton has publicly
forsworn, moreover, has no shortage of proponents. See, e.g., Bryan Caplan, Why Should We Restrict
Immigration?, 32 CATO J. 5, 6 (2012) (declaring the existence of a moral presumption in favor of
open borders and applying a kind of strict scrutiny analysis to laws that restrict immigration); ProOpen Borders People, OPEN BORDERS, https://openborders.info/pro-open-borders-people/ (last
visited Feb. 19, 2019) (listing people who support open borders).
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this field generally seem to interpret the Constitution and other laws in
ways that tend to advance their own preferences. Those preferences run
pretty strongly against restrictionist policies.
I am no expert, nor even much of a dabbler, in the intricacies of the
statutory and regulatory framework. Nor do I have strong views about
immigration policy. Every set of policies, existing and proposed, contains a
complicated mix of potential costs and benefits to the nation as a whole,
and to various groups that have conflicting factional interests. There is also
considerable uncertainty about how the costs and benefits of various policy
options would play out over time. High-decibel moralizing and selfconfident predictions from advocates of various ideological agendas are
frequently accompanied by fallacious arguments and slogans that are
unmoored from reality.5 I’ll confess to thinking that the deportation of
millions of peaceable aliens is no more practicable than it would be
humane. But neither do I think that refusing admission to people who
chanced to be born outside our borders is a grotesque injustice that
demands correction.6 Identifying the optimal policy mix, which must lie
somewhere between these poles, is not an achievement to which I can lay
claim.
My contribution to this Symposium will focus on broader questions
involving federalism. I believe that the Supreme Court’s immigration
jurisprudence is fundamentally misguided, in the sense that it has little basis
in the original meaning of the Constitution. In this Article, I will explain
why I think so and what the Court might do to ameliorate the effects of its
past mistakes without overruling a raft of settled precedents.
Part I analyzes the text of the Constitution, which offers a reasonably
clear allocation of authority over immigration between the state and federal
governments. The Foreign Commerce Clause empowers Congress to limit
the entry of aliens onto American soil, and the Naturalization Clause
authorizes Congress to set uniform criteria for admission to American
citizenship. Nothing on the face of the Constitution permits Congress to
displace the states’ residual authority over aliens, which includes the power
to exclude or expel unsuitable persons from their own territory.
5

6

For an accessible and non-ideological introduction to the economics of immigration policy, see
generally GEORGE J. BORJAS, WE WANTED WORKERS: UNRAVELING THE IMMIGRATION
NARRATIVE (2016).
Cf. Ilya Somin, The Hereditary Aristocracy of Citizenship, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 7, 2018, 6:20
PM),
https://reason.com/volokh/2018/07/07/the-hereditary-aristocracy-of-citizenshi
(maintaining that citizenship, much like membership in old-time aristocracies, “force[s] many
people into poverty and oppression based largely on circumstances of birth,” and thus “often
perpetrates comparably grave injustice”). In my view, it is unjust to conflate a democratically
adopted national decision to withhold the privileges of citizenship from outsiders with the
oppression of a subordinate population by a hereditary political class.
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Part II reviews early debates in Congress about the scope and nature of
federal power over immigration. There were important disagreements,
some of which resemble today’s policy debates, but Congress generally
refrained from going much beyond what the text of the Constitution pretty
clearly authorizes.
Part III traces the evolution of Supreme Court doctrine. The Court
began by rooting federal immigration authority primarily in the Foreign
Commerce Clause, where it belongs, but then misinterpreted that Clause.
In the late nineteenth century, the Justices made a dramatic and largely
unexplained shift to a non-textual theory under which broad federal
authority over immigration and aliens is treated as an inherent aspect of
American sovereignty.
Part IV shows that this doctrinal shift may not have had much practical
significance.
In non-immigration contexts, the Court eventually
interpreted the Commerce Clause itself in a way that gave Congress
practically the same far-reaching authority that the inherent power theory
bestows in the immigration field. Thus, even if the Court had stuck with
the Foreign Commerce Clause as the primary source of federal authority
over immigration, the result would likely have been much the same as what
the Court has mistakenly put in its place.
Part V assumes that the Court is very unlikely to reconsider the wellestablished inherent power theory. In recent decades, however, the Justices
have been experimenting with doctrinal devices designed to put some limits
on the almost unlimited Commerce Clause authority that previous cases
had mistakenly conferred on Congress. The Article concludes with two
examples showing how these limiting doctrines can and should be used to
resolve recent immigration controversies in which some states have desired
to pursue policy objectives to which federal officials object.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT
American federalism, properly understood, rests on two principles that
are derived from the language and structure of the Constitution. First, the
federal government has only those powers that have been delegated to it in
the Constitution, either expressly or by clear implication. Second, and
correlatively, the states possess all powers that have not been taken away
from them—either expressly or by clear implication—by the Constitution
or a valid federal law.7

7

For a model of how these principles should be applied, see U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514
U.S. 779, 845–926 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Article I, Section 8 does not refer expressly to immigration. It does
contain a clause giving Congress the power to establish a uniform rule of
naturalization, and Congress exercised that power right off the bat in the
First Congress.8 Naturalization laws can and do affect immigration, and
the debate about the first naturalization bill in the House resembled today’s
policy disputes in some respects. Some legislators, for example, worried
that too much immigration, especially by the wrong kind of people, would
be detrimental to the country.9 Others worried that erecting obstacles to
citizenship would discourage badly needed workers and investors from
coming to America.10
Accordingly, there were different views about
whether the path to citizenship should be relatively short and easy or more
demanding.11
During that debate, however, no one suggested that the Naturalization
Clause gave Congress any power to control immigration itself. For good
reason. A rule of naturalization specifies the conditions and procedures
under which an alien may become a citizen, which has serious implications
because the Privileges and Immunities Clause curtails the right of state
governments to exclude or discriminate against citizens from other states.12
A uniform national rule of naturalization was the obvious way to address
the negative externalities that could arise if some states naturalized too
many people, or too many people considered undesirable by other states.13
This solution has no necessary implication for rules under which aliens may
be admitted to or excluded from a state’s own territory, or about the
regulation of their rights and obligations while they are present on her soil.
The need for federal discretion to control naturalization does not imply a
need to control immigration, as members of the First Congress
recognized.14

8
9
10
11
12
13
14

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To establish an uniform Rule
of Naturalization . . . .”); Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795).
See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1147–64 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (reporting a House debate on
naturalization bill).
See id.
See id.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”).
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison) (Gideon ed., 1818).
Several Members of the First Congress declared that they lacked authority to displace state
decisions about the substantive rights and privileges of their citizens and objected to a proposal
imposing residence requirements for holding political offices. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note
9, at 1147–64. This proposal was dropped, and the enacted statute went so far as to include this
proviso: “That no person heretofore proscribed by any state, shall be admitted a citizen as
aforesaid, except by an act of the legislature of the state in which such person was proscribed.”
1 Stat. at 104.
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Article I contains another provision that does appear to give Congress a
general authority over immigration, namely the Foreign Commerce
Clause.15 The word “commerce” can refer to almost any form of
intercourse, and the migration of people is not very different from the
import of goods and services.16 The language of the Migration or
Importation Clause,17 moreover, plainly covers free persons and indentured
servants, as well as slaves.18 What would be the point of putting an
15
16

17

18

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations . . . .”).
One might argue that migration into the country does not qualify as commerce because no
formal business arrangement is necessarily involved in any particular crossing of the border.
Migration, however, generally does entail some kind of commercial transaction, such as paying
somebody to transport or guide the migrant, just as a foreigner who wants to send a gift to
someone in the United States must ordinarily pay someone to convey the item across our borders.
Thus, the monopoly law at issue in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), was a regulation
of interstate commerce, even though some of the ferry passengers who traveled from New Jersey
to New York may have had non-commercial reasons for making the trip.
Even in cases where people simply walk across the border, that act is almost always part of
an endeavor aimed at consummating commercial exchanges after they enter the United States,
which would seem to make their migration regulable pursuant to the Necessary and Proper
Clause. If there are isolated cases of migration totally lacking in any commercial element, and
thus perhaps not covered by a technical reading of the word “commerce” in the Constitution, the
states would have authority to provide by law for the migrants’ exclusion and expulsion.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (“The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States
now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year
one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation,
not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.”).
It has been asserted, occasionally during the founding period and more commonly since that
time, that the Migration or Importation Clause applied only to slaves. There was, however, no
consensus during the founding period about the existence of an unstated proviso confining this
clause to the slave trade. See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens,
Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 82
n.572 (2002) (citing comments on both sides of the issue). If the Framers merely wanted to avoid
referring expressly to the “peculiar institution,” they could have done so without including the
word “Migration.” Chief Justice Marshall made the obvious point about the Constitution’s text:
Migration applies as appropriately to voluntary, as importation does to involuntary,
arrivals; and, so far as an exception from a power proves its existence, this section proves
that the power to regulate commerce applies equally to the regulation of vessels
employed in transporting men, who pass from place to place voluntarily, and to those
who pass involuntarily.
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 216–17. Even if the word “Migration” had been omitted, the constitutional
language would apparently still not have referred solely to the slave trade. See Mary Sarah Bilder,
The Struggle Over Immigration: Indentured Servants, Slaves, and Articles of Commerce, 61 MO. L. REV. 743,
761 (1996) (“Indentured servants were simultaneously individuals who increased population and a
pool of bound labor. They were considered a commodity; their movement was part of a
transatlantic commerce. . . . [T]he transportation of indentured servants was generally perceived
as a commerce of ‘imported’ persons.”).
The Federalist is sometimes invoked as support for the slavery-only interpretation. Writing as
Publius in Federalist No. 42, Madison said that the Constitution’s power to regulate foreign
commerce would include a power to prohibit the importation of slaves after 1808. THE
FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 13, at 215 (James Madison). That is indisputable. But the
undoubted applicability of the Clause to the slave trade does not imply that it was inapplicable
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expiration date on this prohibition unless Congress could begin exercising
its regulatory power at the end of the period?19 And where would this
power come from, if not from the Foreign Commerce Clause?
The Foreign Commerce Clause is the most obvious source of
congressional power to regulate immigration, and nothing on the face of
the Constitution forbids the states from continuing to exercise the same
power, as they had been doing before the Constitution was adopted and
would continue to do for at least twenty years afterward. The Supremacy
Clause undoubtedly implies that Congress can preempt such regulations,20
but that is all it does. And nothing on the face of the Constitution deprives
the states of their authority to regulate aliens residing within their borders,
or even to exclude them from their territory.21
This straightforward reading of the Constitution’s text may sound
radically out of step with mainstream thought today. It is certainly not the
Supreme Court’s chosen doctrine, and it is probably safe to say that it never
will be. But that doesn’t make it wrong, especially when one considers how
inconsistent the Court itself has been over time and how analytically weak
and confused the current state of its doctrine is.
II. CONGRESS WEIGHS IN ON THE REGULATION OF ALIENS
Specialists in the field have written detailed studies of America’s
immigration debates and the tortuous evolution of Supreme Court

19

20

21

elsewhere, and Madison drew no such inference. He also said the Clause was not “calculated to
prevent voluntary and beneficial emigrations from Europe to America.” Id. at 217. This was also
quite true. Before 1808, the states had unfettered power to authorize and encourage such
emigration, and nothing in the Clause suggests that either the states or the general government
should prevent such commerce from continuing after 1808. Madison was a careful writer, and a
careful reading of these passages in The Federalist provides no evidence that the Clause was
understood to apply only to the slave trade.
Cf. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 191 (“It is a rule of construction, acknowledged by all, that the exceptions
from a power mark its extent; for it would be absurd, as well as useless, to except from a granted
power, that which was not granted—that which the words of the grant could not comprehend.”).
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”).
In fact, the states continued to exercise a nearly plenary authority over immigration by noncitizens, as well as over resident aliens, for many decades after the Constitution was adopted.
From 1788–1789 alone, four states adopted laws banning entry by anyone convicted of a crime.
During the early nineteenth century, states experimented with a variety of laws designed to
exclude or expel paupers and people carrying infectious diseases. States also adopted a variety of
laws regulating or forbidding the migration of slaves and free blacks. See GERALD L. NEUMAN,
STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 11–
12, 19–43 (1996).
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doctrine, which I will not attempt to replicate.22 It will suffice to touch here
on a few of the most important historical and jurisprudential moments.
The first significant debate about the regulation of aliens came in 1798,
in what was also the first great national controversy about federalism.23
The context was an undeclared and politically divisive naval war with
France. Congress was dominated by Federalists, who pushed through
several bills that purported to strengthen national security.24 Jeffersonians
strongly opposed the Adams Administration’s hostility toward the French
Revolution and saw the new laws as devices for suppressing domestic
political dissent.25 Indeed, the Jeffersonians thought the Federalists were
trying to destroy their political party, and they fought back with vigor.26
The intensity of the opposition to these Alien and Sedition Acts was so
strong that Madison and Jefferson induced the legislatures of Virginia and
Kentucky, respectively, to declare some of them unconstitutional and to
urge resistance against their enforcement.27 That storm passed, as one
hopes that today’s divisive debates will also subside. I will focus here on
certain legal questions raised by these controversial statutes.
There were two Alien Acts. The Alien Enemies Act generated little
controversy at the time, and it remains on the books in a slightly modified
form today.28 This statute authorized the President to deport citizens or
subjects of a nation with which we were at war.29 It would be hard to deny
that this is a necessary and proper means of carrying out the war powers
expressly granted by the Constitution to Congress and the President. Even
the Jeffersonians in Congress ended up supporting this bill.30
The so-called Alien Friends Act presented a tougher case.31 This statute
gave the President virtually unfettered authority to deport any resident
alien he judged to be dangerous to the peace and safety of the nation.32
The House of Representatives conducted an extended debate about which

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

31
32

A useful study of materials bearing on my topic can be found in Cleveland, supra note 18, at 81–
163.
Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 927 (1991).
Id.
Id. at 928.
Id.
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: PRIMARY SOURCES 398–400 (Bruce Frohnen ed., 2002).
Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (codified as amended 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2012)).
Id.
See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789–
1801, at 255 (1997) (“Republicans sputtered over the vagueness of the alien enemies bill when it
was first introduced but did not attack it in principle, and it was they who finally insisted on its
enactment once some of its more objectionable features were withdrawn.” (footnotes omitted)).
Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570.
Id.
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provision of the Constitution, if any, authorized the bill.33 Proponents
offered a number of theories about the constitutional basis for the
deportation power which ranged from the dubious to the borderline
absurd.
One seemingly plausible suggestion relied on the Foreign Commerce
Clause, whose plain language allows the exclusion of aliens. But how does
that imply authority to expel aliens after they have become lawful residents?
One Member defended the bill on the ground that foreigners generally
came here for commercial purposes, but that claim was rebutted with the
observation that the bill did not regulate merchants as such, and that it had
nothing to do with how commerce was carried on.34
Another colorable argument was that the bill represented a reasonable
extension of the principle that justified the Alien Enemy Act. Aliens from
nations with which we are not at war, or not yet at war, might be just as
dangerous as people who are technically enemy aliens.35 No doubt, but the
same could be said of slaves.36 If all of the slaves were subject to
deportation at the discretion of Congress, the abolition of slavery could
have been accomplished by an act of the national legislature. Nobody
thought that would be constitutional. An even more outlandish argument
rested on references to the general welfare in the Preamble and in the
Taxation Clause.37 Such theories make the enumeration of powers in
Article I sheer surplusage, and would have authorized just about anything,
including for example the abolition of slavery.38
Finally, in an argument completely detached from the text of the
Constitution, an inherent federal power to expel aliens was conjured out of
the nature of government.39 This may be the most far-fetched argument of
them all since it evades the obligation to show that the power was given to
the federal government rather than left with the states. It is also the very
argument on which the Supreme Court eventually settled, as we shall see.

33

34
35

36
37
38
39

There was also debate about whether the measure violated the civil rights of aliens and whether it
delegated too much discretion to the President. I leave these issues aside in order to focus on the
principles of federalism.
8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1958, 1974–75 (1798) (Joseph Gales ed., 1851).
Id. at 1986–87. The Sedition Act was defended by John Marshall and others with a similar
argument. See Report of the Minority on the Virginia Resolutions, reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION 136–39 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987); Kurt T. Lash & Alicia
Harrison, Minority Report: John Marshall and the Defense of the Alien and Sedition Acts, 68 OHIO ST. L.J.
435 (2007). That is a sign of the seductiveness of such arguments, not of their soundness.
8 ANNALS OF CONG. supra note 34, at 1996.
Id. at 1969.
Id. at 1968.
Id. at 1969–70.
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The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions very plausibly denied that the
federal government had been delegated authority to displace the states’
power over resident aliens during peacetime.40 The Alien Friends Act was
apparently never enforced, and it expired in 1800. In the following
decades, Congress did next to nothing in the way of regulating immigration
(except for outlawing the slave trade) or resident aliens (outside the
naturalization context). This left the states free to adopt regulations of their
own, including laws that excluded undesirable aliens, and the states did
exactly that.41
III. THE SUPREME COURT TAKES OVER
The law might have been left right there, which is where the text of the
Constitution seems to put it. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court embarked
on one of its weirder jurisprudential journeys, which created what we know
as the dormant or negative commerce power, and eventually what is known
as the inherent power doctrine.
Gibbons v. Ogden drew the plausible inference that Congress has plenary
authority to regulate commerce, “that is, to prescribe the rule by which
commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress,
is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the
constitution.”42 This was almost enough to answer the constitutional
question posed by the Gibbons case: because the Court interpreted a federal
statute (however dubiously) to preempt New York’s ferry boat monopoly,
this inference effectively decided the issue.43 Many questions were left open
about the line dividing commerce internal to a state from interstate and
foreign commerce and about the reach of the Necessary and Proper
Clause. Some of those questions have proved to be very challenging. But
few serious questions need ever have arisen about the authority of the states
to regulate interstate and foreign commerce in the absence of a preemptive
federal law.
The text of the Constitution answers that question with about as much
clarity as one could hope for. Why would one even think that the

40
41
42
43

THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, supra note 27, at 399–400.
NEUMAN, supra note 21, at 19–43.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824).
Justice Johnson argued, quite persuasively in my view, that New York’s statute was not preempted
by the federal law on which Chief Justice Marshall relied. Johnson therefore could not avoid the
question of state power to regulate interstate commerce, as Marshall did. He answered the
question with an extensive argument in favor of interpreting the Commerce Clause to grant an
exclusive power to Congress. Id. at 222–40 (Johnson, J., concurring).
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Constitution took this power away from the states? The Framers were
quite capable of assigning certain powers exclusively to the federal
government. Article I, for example, gives Congress the power to “exercise
exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever” over the district established as
the seat of government.44 Similarly, the Constitution expressly prohibits the
states from exercising certain powers that are given to the federal
government, such as making treaties, coining money, and emitting bills of
credit.45 Some powers, moreover, may be exercised by the states only with
the consent of Congress.46 The text of the Constitution uses none of these
locutions to abolish or limit the preexisting authority of the states over
interstate and foreign commerce. Nor does the Constitution give Congress
a power to establish “uniform” laws on this subject, which might at least
have suggested that once Congress enters the field the states are implicitly
ousted from it.47
Unfortunately, Marshall’s opinion in Gibbons contains some obiter dicta
to the effect that the following argument has “great force”:
[T]hat, as the word ‘to regulate’ implies in its nature, full power over the
thing to be regulated, it excludes, necessarily, the action of all others that
would perform the same operation on the same thing. That regulation is
designed for the entire result, applying to those parts which remain as they
were, as well as to those which are altered. It produces a uniform whole,
which is as much disturbed and deranged by changing what the regulating
power designs to leave untouched, as that on which it has operated.48

Whatever force such an argument might have had in a case dealing
with the Constitution’s provisions conferring power to establish a
“uniform” rule of naturalization or “uniform” laws on bankruptcies, it has
no force at all as an inference based entirely on the word “regulate.” Nor
has the Court ever accepted the argument to which Marshall attributed
“great force.”
Some Justices have argued, a bit more plausibly, that the purpose of the
Commerce Clause implies that the states must be deprived of a concurrent
regulatory power. That purpose is usually understood as the prevention of
friction among the states, or the prevention of economic protectionism, or
both.49 Apart from the lack of support for an inference of exclusivity in the
44
45
46
47

48
49

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (emphasis added).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cls. 2–3.
That would not by any means be a necessary inference, as the Supreme Court recognized at an
early date with respect to the bankruptcy power. See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
122 (1819) (holding that the congressional power to establish “uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States” is concurrent rather than exclusive). But at least it
would have been an inference with some connection to the Constitution.
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 209 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., id. at 222–40 (Johnson, J., concurring); H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S.
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text of the Constitution, the arguments resting on the purpose of the Clause
are manifestly fallacious. The Constitution contains two other provisions
that allow those very purposes to be achieved without any assistance from a
judicially concocted dormant commerce power. First, the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV forbids the states from engaging in much
of the behavior that has so concerned those who have thought the states
require judicial supervision. Second, whatever is left over could easily be
addressed through congressional exercise of the regulatory authority
actually provided in the Commerce Clause.
Although the Court never adopted the exclusivity theory alluded to in
Gibbons, another dictum from that case had more influence, at least for a
while. Acknowledging that the states undoubtedly retain authority over an
immense mass of legislation dealing with such things as health,
transportation, and local commerce, Marshall suggested that they might
sometimes use the so-called police power to do just what Congress can do
under the Commerce Clause:50
All experience shows, that the same measures, or measures scarcely
distinguishable from each other, may flow from distinct powers; but this
does not prove that the powers themselves are identical. Although the
means used in their execution may sometimes approach each other so
nearly as to be confounded, there are other situations in which they are
sufficiently distinct to establish their individuality.51

This principle enabled the Court to avoid resolving the exclusivity issue
in Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co.52 and New York v. Miln.53 Miln
deserves special attention here because it upheld a state immigration law
which required the master of a vessel to give local officials a list with the
names and other information about all passengers being brought into the
City of New York. Justice Barbour’s majority opinion stressed that “a state
has the same undeniable and unlimited jurisdiction over all persons and
things, within its territorial limits, as any foreign nation; where that
jurisdiction is not surrendered or restrained by the constitution of the
United States.”54 Gibbons had expressly approved local inspection laws that
protected against tainted goods, and Miln recognized an equal right of the
states to guard against the moral or economic pestilence of paupers,
vagabonds, and convicts.55

50
51
52
53
54
55

525, 532–36 (1949); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994).
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 203–04.
Id. at 204.
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829) (relying, implicitly, on a police power justification to uphold a state law
that authorized the building of a dam that obstructed a navigable waterway of the United States).
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 132–133 (1837).
Id. at 139.
Id. at 142–43; see also id. at 132 (“We shall not enter into any examination of the question whether

Mar. 2019]

IMMIGRATION SANCTUARIES AND ANTI-SANCTUARIES

1003

Two subsequent cases featured vigorous but inconclusive skirmishes
about the exclusivity issue.56 In Cooley v. Board of Wardens,57 the Court finally
put the general theory to rest. The case involved a state law requiring the
use of local pilots in the Port of Philadelphia. This was undoubtedly a
regulation of navigation and, thus, a regulation of interstate and foreign
commerce under Gibbons. Rather than pretend that the law was actually an
exercise of the police power, and that this case was distinguishable from
Gibbons, which would have been hard to do with a straight face, Justice
Curtis invented a whole new theory. Subjects of the federal commerce
power that are “in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform
system . . . require exclusive legislation by Congress.”58 The local pilot law
at issue was upheld because the Court concluded that a diversity of rules
was needed to deal with the peculiarities of navigation in various ports.59
This theory has no basis in the text of the Constitution, which does not
distinguish between “national” commerce and “local interstate” commerce
or “local foreign” commerce. By liberating constitutional doctrine from the
Constitution’s text (and its history as well), the Court empowered itself to
become an almost unfettered arbiter of the extent to which state
governments would be allowed to govern anything that can be
characterized as commerce. Cooley even went so far as to proclaim that
Congress is forbidden to give states the privilege of regulating “national”
interstate and foreign commerce.60 Although the Court later relented on
this issue,61 its own power has not been much reduced as a practical matter.

56

57
58
59
60
61

the power to regulate commerce, be or be not exclusive of the states, because the opinion which
we have formed renders it unnecessary: in other words, we are of opinion that the act is not a
regulation of commerce, but of police; and that being thus considered, it was passed in the
exercise of a power which rightfully belonged to the states.”).
Justice Story’s lone dissent maintained, quite correctly, that if a regulation like the one at
issue in this case had been adopted by Congress, it would have been authorized by the Commerce
Clause. That becomes irrelevant once one accepts Marshall’s statement in Gibbons that the same
or very similar actions can be taken pursuant to the federal commerce power and the states’
police power. In a shockingly blatant mischaracterization of the public record, however, Story
maintained that this rendered the New York statute unconstitutional because Chief Justice
Marshall had resolved the exclusivity issue in Gibbons. See id. at 158 (Story, J., dissenting). He
even went so far as to maintain that Marshall, who had died while Miln was pending before the
Court, agreed that Gibbons had adopted the exclusivity theory. Id. at 161.
Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849); License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).
Although several Justices addressed the exclusivity issue in their opinions, there was no majority
opinion in either case.
53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
Id. at 319.
Id. at 319–20.
See id. at 318.
See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
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With respect to typical commercial activities, the Justices eventually
erected a Rube Goldberg dormant commerce contraption that continues to
divide the Justices and to baffle anyone who tries to make sense of their
jurisprudence.62 With respect to immigration, however, they took a
somewhat different path.
The first step was to use Cooley’s theory to create a new rule of federal
exclusivity for some immigration cases. Miln had upheld a state
immigration regulation as a valid exercise of the police power, and Cooley’s
immediate effect was therefore to extend protection for state prerogatives
even to certain regulations of interstate commerce itself. Henderson v. Mayor
of New York,63 however, deployed the judicial discretion inherent in the
Cooley test to go in the opposite direction. The Court now invoked Cooley to
invalidate a state law that addressed the threat of indigent immigrants by
requiring shipowners to post a bond or pay a fee for each passenger
brought into the state.64 It was clear, thought the Court, that the laws
governing the right to land passengers from other countries ought to be the
same in all American ports, and it was unclear whether the states have a
right to do anything at all to protect themselves from undesirable
immigrants if Congress does not do it for them.65
Simultaneously, Chy Lung v. Freeman66 struck down a California statute
that required a bond from a ship’s owner or master when a state inspector
suspected specific immigrants of having undesirable traits such as lunacy,
physical handicaps, criminal records, or bad morals. In this case, the Court
at least offered a reason for disabling the states from screening immigrants:
“[O]therwise, a single State can, at her pleasure, embroil us in disastrous
quarrels with other nations.”67 In neither Henderson nor Chy Lung, however,
did the Court explain why the Constitution does not trust Congress to use
its unquestioned Commerce Clause power to prevent the bad effects that so
worried the Justices. This should be no surprise as there is nothing in the
Constitution that evinces such mistrust. These cases thus confirm that the
Cooley theory was not only unmoored from the Constitution’s text but also

62

63
64
65
66
67

For a review, see Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 259–65
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For recent examples of the
continuing confusion, see, for example, United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt.
Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007) or C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
92 U.S. 259 (1875).
Id. at 272–73.
Id. at 273, 275.
92 U.S. 275 (1875).
Id. at 280. Once again, the Court expressed doubt about the right of states to do anything to
protect themselves from undesirable immigrants and stressed that, even if such a right exists, it
“can only arise from a vital necessity for its exercise, and cannot be carried beyond the scope of
that necessity.” Id.
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unchained from the most basic principles of enumerated and separated
powers.
Those structure-of-government principles were soon weakened in a
different way. Chy Lung’s allusion to foreign relations provided the Court’s
very odd rationale for exercising a power given by the Constitution not to
the judiciary but to Congress. In Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese
Exclusion Case),68 the Court addressed the flip side, pointing to foreign
relations as the reason for construing congressional authority over aliens
very broadly. The California Gold Rush had attracted immigrants from
countries around the world, including China. In 1868, the United States
entered into a treaty with China for other reasons, and Congress
subsequently enacted implementing legislation that regulated the treatment
of Chinese nationals in America.69 By 1878, Congress was coming under
tremendous political pressure to curtail the numbers of Chinese on the west
coast.70 Most of them were unmarried men who worked as laborers, often
underbidding their domestic competitors, and they were thought to be
unwilling to assimilate into American life. Congress finally enacted a
statute providing, among other things, that certain Chinese nationals who
went back to China would not be readmitted to the United States, even if
they had been given certificates authorizing their reentry when they left.71
Chae Chan Ping found that this statute contravened express provisions of
the 1868 treaty, but held that Congress has the authority to repeal or
modify treaties whenever it sees fit, just as it may repeal or modify
statutes.72 The Court might then have upheld the statute as a regulation of
foreign commerce, which it obviously was. Instead, the Court suggested
that the power to exclude aliens is an aspect of sovereignty that the federal
government must possess because the United States is a sovereign nation.
That the government of the United States, through the action of the
legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition
which we do not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own
territory to that extent is an incident of every independent nation. It is a
part of its independence. If it could not exclude aliens it would be to that
extent subject to the control of another power. . . .
While under our Constitution and form of government the great mass of
local matters is controlled by local authorities, the United States, in their
relation to foreign countries and their subjects or citizens are one nation,
invested with powers which belong to independent nations, the exercise of
which can be invoked for the maintenance of its absolute independence

68
69
70
71
72

130 U.S. 581 (1889).
Cleveland, supra note 18, at 112–16.
Id.
Id.
Chae Chan Ping, 92 U.S. at 609.
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and security throughout its entire territory. The powers to declare war,
make treaties, suppress insurrection, repel invasion, regulate foreign
commerce, secure republican governments to the States, and admit
subjects of other nations to citizenship, are all sovereign powers, restricted
in their exercise only by the Constitution itself and considerations of public
policy and justice which control, more or less, the conduct of all civilized
nations.73

One might try reading this passage to mean no more than that the
enumerated powers of Congress convey the authority to exclude aliens
from the United States. This would be wishful thinking. The list of
sovereign powers with which the passage concludes contains items that
have nothing to do with immigration, and the Court does not attribute the
exclusion power to any specific constitutional provisions. Much of the
opinion, moreover, is occupied with establishing the proposition that the
exclusion power is an aspect of sovereignty under international law. The
sovereign American states no doubt possessed that power before the
Constitution was adopted, but whether this (or any other) aspect of
sovereignty remains with the states, or was delegated to the new federal
government, is a question to which international law is hardly dispositive, if
it is even relevant.
One might argue that the Court’s verbiage amounts to little more than
harmless error because it is so obvious that the regulation at issue in Chae
Chan Ping was a valid exercise of the foreign commerce power. The last
paragraph of the Court’s opinion seems to offer some support for this
reading because it distinguishes the challenged statute (which involved
exclusion of aliens) from the 1798 Alien Friends Act, which involved expulsion,
and notes that the constitutionality of the latter statute had been challenged
“by men of great ability and learning.”74 In Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
however, the Court declared that the “absolute and unqualified” right to
expel aliens rests on the same ground as the right to exclude.75 Even more
clearly than in Chae Chan Ping, the Court rested its holding entirely on a
theory of sovereignty associated with international law and completely
detached from the constitutional principle of limited and enumerated
powers.
The general principles of public law which lie at the foundation of these
cases are clearly established by previous judgments of this court, and by the
authorities therein referred to.
73

74
75

Id. at 603–04; see also id. at 609 (“The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of
sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States as a part of those sovereign powers
delegated by the Constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the
government, the interests of the country require it, cannot be granted away or restrained on
behalf of any one.” (emphasis added)).
Id. at 610.
149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893).
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In the recent case of Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659,
the court, in sustaining the action of the executive department, putting in
force an act of Congress for the exclusion of aliens, said ‘It is an accepted
maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as
inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the
entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such
cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe. In the United
States, this power is vested in the national government, to which the
Constitution has committed the entire control of international relations, in
peace as well as in war. It belongs to the political department of the
government, and may be exercised either through treaties made by the
President and Senate, or through statutes enacted by Congress.’
....
The United States are a sovereign and independent nation, and are
vested by the Constitution with the entire control of international relations,
and with all the powers of government necessary to maintain that control
and to make it effective. The only government of this country, which other
nations recognize or treat with, is the government of the Union, and the
only American flag known throughout the world is the flag of the United
States.76

This doctrine has been repeatedly reaffirmed. As the Court recently put it:
The Government of the United States has broad, undoubted power over
the subject of immigration and the status of aliens. This authority rests, in
part, on the National Government’s constitutional power to ‘establish an
uniform Rule of Naturalization,’ and its inherent power as sovereign to
control and conduct relations with foreign nations.77

The Court never explained why it shifted from the Commerce Clause
to this inherent power theory based on international law. But the shift is
now so firmly embedded in the case law that the principle of limited and
enumerated federal powers seems beyond recovery.78

76
77
78

Id. at 704–05, 711.
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394–95 (2012) (internal citations omitted) (citing Toll v.
Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982); then quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4).
As Henderson indicated even before the inherent power theory was adopted, the Court appears to
regard authority over immigration as exclusively federal. For an argument that this should be
treated as a question that is still open, and that classic values of federalism should be operable, see
Claire Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787
(2008).
The much-criticized “plenary power doctrine,” which is a kind of offshoot of the inherent
power theory, has been used to limit the individual constitutional rights available to aliens. The
Supreme Court’s decisions have been trending away from this theory of absolute power in the
context of individuals, but not in the context of the rights of states. See Alina Das, Administrative
Constitutionalism in Immigration Law, 98 B.U. L. REV. 485, 496, 496 n.46 (2018). One commentator
suggests that the Court has adopted an especially aggressive preemption approach in the
immigration context as a substitute in part for a stronger equal protection doctrine that would
give illegal aliens more protection. Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601
(2013).
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IV. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE ALTERNATIVE TO THE INHERENT POWER
THEORY
Perhaps the Court’s repudiation of the structural Constitution has made
no practical difference. If the Justices had continued to look primarily to
the Commerce Clause as the source of authority for immigration
regulations, as they did until the late nineteenth century,79 they might still
have ended up with a jurisprudence effectively indistinguishable from what
they have erected on the basis of the inherent power fiction. The inherent
power theory was adopted at a time when the Court was attempting to
develop interstate commerce doctrines that would put meaningful limits on
congressional power to displace the regulatory authority of the states.80
Perhaps the Justices were more reluctant to interfere with congressional
discretion in a context that might have implications for our foreign
relations.81 In the end, however, the Court wound up in pretty much the
same place with respect to ordinary commerce as it did with respect to
immigration.
The Court’s experiments with limitations on the commerce power were
not successful. This case law never came close to generating an analytically
elegant doctrine, let alone one that could stand up against the political
forces driving Congress to regulate more and more of American life.
Beginning with several famous decisions associated with the New Deal, the
Court appeared for many decades to have conferred a general police power
on Congress.
If a small business buys and sells products across state lines, that’s all it
takes to justify congressional regulation of labor relations within the
company.82 The federal government can decide how much workers must
be paid and how long they may work, so long as their employer produces
goods destined for another state.83 Limits can be put on the crops a farmer
may grow, even for his own use, if such use by enough farmers could affect
79

80

81
82
83

I say “primarily” because some regulations can no doubt be justified under other provisions of the
Constitution, as the 1798 Alien Enemies Act was. The federal government’s general
responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations, however, cannot create a general power to
regulate resident aliens for the same reason that the Necessary and Proper Clause did not justify
the Alien Friends and Sedition Acts of 1798. Cf. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 498–99 (2008)
(refusing to preempt state law limits on successive habeas corpus petitions that were alleged to
conflict with American treaty obligations and with the President’s discretion to manage the
nation’s foreign relations).
See e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578
(1898); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82
(1879); United States v. DeWitt, 76 U.S. 41 (1870).
See Cleveland, supra note 18, at 133–34.
NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937).
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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the price of farm products in other states.84 The commerce power can be
used to ban racial discrimination at any small business that uses products
from another state or serves customers from other states.85 A local loan
shark can be prosecuted under federal law because some other loan sharks
belong to gangs that have interstate operations.86 Good luck finding
anyone who does much of anything that isn’t also done by some interstate
enterprise, or couldn’t affect interstate commerce if enough people did it.
In 1995, the Supreme Court’s Lopez decision shocked the legal world by
finding that Congress had exceeded its Commerce Clause authority when it
criminalized the possession of a firearm in or near a school.87 The Court
concluded that the law had nothing to do with commerce or any sort of
economic activity, and that the conduct it regulated could not substantially
affect interstate commerce through repetition elsewhere.88 Five years later,
the Court reviewed a statute that created a civil cause of action for victims
of “gender-motivated violence,” and held that Congress may not regulate
violent criminal conduct solely because of the aggregate effect of such
conduct on interstate commerce.89
Lopez did not purport to overrule any prior decisions, and the opinion
raised more questions about the scope of the commerce power than it
answered. But because the Court had finally identified something that is
beyond Congress’s reach, many observers hoped or feared that the decision
signaled a coming restoration of the principle of limited and enumerated
federal powers.90 Soon enough, however, any such expectations proved to
have been misplaced. Congress reenacted the gun-free school zone law,
along with a new provision requiring prosecutors to prove that the firearm
had at some time traveled in interstate commerce.91 Lopez had signaled that
this was one way for the legislature to convert a local activity into one that
Congress could regulate, and the new statute has been upheld.92 If an
object acquires a magical power to subject anyone who possesses it to the
regulatory jurisdiction of Congress, merely because the object crossed state
lines at some time in the past, the Constitution’s principle of enumerated

84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
Id. at 561–63.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
See Symposium, Reflections on United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 533 (1995); Symposium,
The New Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 633 (1996).
See 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2012).
United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Danks, 221 F.3d 1037
(8th Cir. 1999).
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powers is not much more than a guideline for drafting statutes.93
Congress has not yet reenacted the sexual violence statute, but it
apparently need only add a requirement that a plaintiff prove some kind of
interstate nexus. Perhaps the defendant had moved across a state line to
attend college.94 Or perhaps he committed the tort while wearing clothing
manufactured in another state or containing materials from out of state.
Or perhaps he drove to the scene of the tort in an automobile containing
parts manufactured out of state.
In addition to the interstate-nexus gambit, Lopez also alluded to
regulations forming an essential part of a larger regulation of economic
activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the
intrastate activity is regulated.95 This was the basis on which a federal
regulation controlling the consumption of home-grown agricultural
products had previously been upheld, and the Court extended its reach by
applying it to marijuana grown and consumed in a state that specifically
authorized use of the plant for medical purposes.96
So far, the Court has recognized only trivial or symbolic limits on the
reach of the Commerce Clause. In NFIB v. Sebelius,97 for example, five
Justices, including Chief Justice Roberts, concluded that the Commerce
Clause does not authorize Congress to force consumers to participate in
commerce by purchasing specified kinds of health insurance policies that
they don’t want. But Roberts then joined the four who dissented from this
conclusion in upholding the program anyway. The legal mandate to
purchase health insurance, which was enforced by what the statute called a
“penalty,” was converted by the Court into a mere suggestion, and the
penalty was dubbed a tax that consumers were free to avoid by engaging in
the kind of commerce Congress wanted to stimulate.98 Roberts’ opinion
acknowledged that the only reason to interpret the mandate-plus-penalty as
a voluntarily incurred tax was to avoid holding it unconstitutional.99 To
complete the farce, he waved away serious arguments that such a tax would
be subject to the Constitution’s apportionment requirement with the

93

94
95
96
97
98
99

Cf. United States v. Alderman, 565 F.3d 641, 646 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the sale of body
armor in interstate commerce creates a sufficient nexus between possession of the body armor
and commerce to allow for federal regulation under the Commerce Clause). A petition for
certiorari was denied in this case, over the dissent of Justice Thomas (joined by Justice Scalia).
562 U.S. 1163 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Cf. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (noting that in that case there was “no indication that [the defendant]
had recently moved in interstate commerce”).
Id. at 561.
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
567 U.S. 519 (2012).
Id. at 561–74.
Id.
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question-begging comment that the Court had not previously recognized a
category of direct taxes that would include this unprecedented kind of
tax.100
V. WHAT NOW?
Although the Supreme Court has been unwilling to recognize any
meaningful limits on the scope of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause, it has used other techniques to preserve a modest
sphere of state autonomy. Nothing about the Court’s inherent power
theory should prevent those doctrines from being adapted and applied in
the immigration field.
Consider, for example, the regulation of the states themselves. Well
before Lopez, the Court had repeatedly confronted questions about
congressional power to regulate the wages and hours of state and local
employees. The federal government had engaged in such regulation of
private businesses since the New Deal, and Congress began extending
coverage to various categories of state employees in the 1960s. In Maryland
v. Wirtz,101 the Court upheld the new regulations as a valid exercise of the
commerce power. In 1976, National League of Cities v. Usery102 overruled
Wirtz and sought to articulate a legal test that would limit congressional
power over the states. In 1985, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority103 overruled National League of Cities, holding that Congress has the
same extensive authority to regulate the states and their subdivisions that
the Court has given it over private employers. In response to the majority’s
insistence that the states must rely on the political process for protection
against federal overreaching, four Justices vigorously dissented. They
refused to acquiesce in what Justices Powell and O’Connor characterized as
an abdication of judicial responsibility,104 or to rely on what Justice
O’Connor wryly called Congress’s “underdeveloped capacity for selfrestraint.”105

100
101
102
103
104

105

Id.
392 U.S. 183 (1968).
426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976).
469 U.S. 528, 531, 556 (1985).
Id. at 567 n.12 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“This Court has never before abdicated responsibility for
assessing the constitutionality of challenged action on the ground that affected parties theoretically
are able to look out for their own interests through the electoral process.”); id. at 581 (O’Connor,
J., dissenting) (“If federalism so conceived and so carefully cultivated by the Framers of our
Constitution is to remain meaningful, this Court cannot abdicate its constitutional responsibility
to oversee the Federal Government’s compliance with its duty to respect the legitimate interests of
the States.”).
Id. at 588 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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A few years later, Gregory v. Ashcroft106 created a new canon of statutory
construction designed to restore some protection for the states from federal
regulation. Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion suggested that Garcia
should not be considered settled law, but it refrained from overruling it.107
Instead, the Court adopted a clear-statement rule under which federal
regulatory statutes will be deemed to apply to the states only when the text
does so without the slightest ambiguity.108 This interpretive rule reduces
the likelihood that Congress will casually or inadvertently regulate the
states, and makes it more difficult for courts and executive agencies to find
authority for regulations that Congress did not affirmatively enact.
In another post-Garcia development, the Court has developed an “anticommandeering” doctrine that forbids Congress to require states to assist in
the administration of federal regulatory programs. New York v. United
States109 and Murphy v. NCAA110 held that state legislatures may not be
ordered either to enact or refrain from enacting laws. Printz v. United
States111 applied the anti-commandeering principle to protect state executive
officials from being ordered to administer federal regulatory programs.
The doctrine discourages Congress from displacing the regulatory authority
of the states because it will often be costlier, in financial and political terms,
for the federal government to impose and administer a program itself than
to conscript the states as its agents.
A third doctrine involves conditional grants to the states. The Supreme
Court has held that Congress may spend money in the pursuit of the
general welfare, whether or not the spending would be authorized by any of
the specific grants of legislative power in Article I.112 To call this doctrine
dubious would be an understatement. Writing as Publius in The Federalist,
Madison explained with his customary incisiveness why this conclusion is
inconsistent with the text of the Constitution and why it would subvert the
Constitution’s use of enumeration to limit congressional power.113 What is
106
107
108
109
110
111
112

113

501 U.S. 452 (1991).
Id. at 464.
Id. at 460–61, 467.
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997).
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65–66, 68 (1936). After endorsing this general proposition,
the Court then declared: “We are not now required to ascertain the scope of the phrase ‘general
welfare of the United States’ or to determine whether an appropriation in aid of agriculture falls
within it. Wholly apart from that question, another principle embedded in our Constitution
prohibits the enforcement of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. The act invades the reserved rights
of the states.” Id. at 68. The Court did not explain how these putative rights could have been
reserved to the states except through the absence in the Constitution of a delegation to Congress
of a power to aid agriculture.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, supra note 13, at 213–15 (James Madison).
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often mislabeled as the Spending Clause gives Congress powers of taxation;
it says nothing about spending, and its reference to the general welfare
refers only to a purpose for which the taxation power may be exercised.
The power to spend money actually arises from the Necessary and Proper
Clause, and thus must be anchored in some other specific constitutional
authorization.
The Court’s misinterpretation of the spending power complements its
nearly total abandonment of restrictions on congressional regulatory power
under the Commerce Clause. But as with the anti-commandeering
doctrine and Gregory’s clear-statement rule, the Court has at least
recognized the need to inhibit the legislature from casually displacing state
authority. One way that Congress puts pressure on the states to adopt
federal policies is through conditional grants: offers of money that come
with provisos requiring recipient states to comply with federal dictates. The
Court has tried in various ways to reduce the temptation for abuse of this
lever. As South Dakota v. Dole noted, if Congress places conditions on grants
to the states, it “must do so unambiguously . . . , enabl[ing] the States to
exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their
participation.”114 Another potentially powerful restraint is that the
conditions must be related to the federal interest in whatever is being
funded.115
The Foreign Commerce Clause is fairly read to authorize Congress to
limit the admission of aliens, and to enforce its decisions by removing aliens
who enter or remain in the United States without federal authorization.

114
115

483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
Id. at 207–08 (“[O]ur cases have suggested (without significant elaboration) that conditions on
federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated ‘to the federal interest in particular
national projects or programs.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435
U.S. 444, 461 (1978))); cf. id. at 213 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (objecting that the Court’s
“application [in this case] of the requirement that the condition imposed be reasonably related to
the purpose for which the funds are expended is cursory and unconvincing”).
The underlying spending is also supposed to be invalid if it does not serve the general
welfare, but this restriction has been utterly toothless, as the Court itself seems to have recognized.
See id. at 207 & n.2. The Court has also noted the obvious rule that conditions on federal grants
may not require a state to do something that would be unconstitutional for the state to do on its
own, such as violate individual rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 208.
Finally, financial inducements offered to the states may not be so coercive that they go
beyond pressure to compulsion. Id. at 211. In NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 519, 580–83, the
Court held that the threatened loss of more than ten percent of a state’s total budget was a “gun
to the head” that constituted “economic dragooning.” The Court provided virtually no
explanation of where the line might lie between permissibly coercive pressure and impermissibly
coercive compulsion, and it seems unlikely that Congress will take steps in the immigration area
that come close to crossing whatever line the Court may someday draw.
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But that’s about it.116 The Court’s inherent power doctrine, standing alone,
displaces the police power of the states with respect to the regulation and
even expulsion of resident aliens in ways that are generally inconsistent with
the original meaning of the Constitution. Because there is almost no
chance that the Court will revive the principles of the Constitution itself, it
should at least take ameliorative steps akin to those it has taken with respect
to the Commerce Clause and the spending power.
Although the three ameliorative doctrines just summarized do not
necessarily reflect the original meaning of the Constitution,117 they do push
the outcomes of judicial policymaking in a direction more consistent with
the original meaning. For that reason, these existing doctrines should be
used, and in some cases extended, to minimize the infringements on state
autonomy made possible by the Court’s misguided immigration
jurisprudence. The principles summarized in South Dakota v. Dole, along
with the anti-commandeering decisions, can readily reduce one form of
federal overreach. The Supreme Court should go even further by applying
Gregory v. Ashcroft’s clear-statement rule in all cases that involve federal
intrusions on the power of states to regulate aliens within their borders.
Two examples may be used to illustrate my proposal. First, states that
refuse to assist the federal government in enforcing valid federal
immigration laws are exercising their inherent constitutional right to
regulate or refrain from regulating aliens as they see fit. Similarly, other
states are exercising the same constitutional right when they supplement
federal efforts to enforce valid federal laws with state regulations that go
beyond what the federal government has chosen to adopt. The genuine
constitutional right of the states to regulate and even expel aliens from their
territory is much broader, but existing judicial doctrine can easily be
shaped to recognize at least a modicum of the discretion that the
Constitution itself leaves with the state governments.
A. Sanctuaries
Many local jurisdictions and some states have adopted so-called
sanctuary policies under which they refuse, to one degree or another, to
116

117

There are no doubt some specific and limited circumstances in which Congress does have
legitimate grounds for exercising additional powers, such as providing for traditional grants of
diplomatic immunity and for the expulsion of enemy aliens during time of war.
See, e.g., Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957, 1960, 1967
(1993) (collecting evidence that the original meaning of the Constitution permits Congress to
compel state executive officers to enforce federal law); Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling
Textualism and Federalism: The Proper Textual Basis of the Supreme Court’s Tenth and Eleventh Amendment
Decisions, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 819, 829, 831, 845, 847 (1999) (criticizing New York and Printz, and
proposing an alternative rationale for an anti-commandeering doctrine).
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assist or cooperate with the federal agencies charged with enforcing
immigration laws.118 Such cooperation generated some controversies in the
1980s, and federal efforts to enlist state and local agencies in immigration
enforcement accelerated after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.119 Although these
efforts slowed in some respects toward the end of the Obama
Administration, they have been pushed hard again by the Trump
Administration. Several rationales have been advanced for sanctuary
policies, perhaps most importantly that local police can more effectively
enforce the ordinary criminal law if victims and witnesses are not
discouraged from cooperating by fear of trouble arising from their
immigration status.120
Whatever their merits or shortcomings as law enforcement policies,
voluntary efforts by local officials to cooperate with the federal government
are commonplace and perfectly legal.121 Federal efforts to pressure local
officials to help with immigration enforcement, which intensified in 2017,
do raise serious issues. Shortly after his inauguration, for example,
President Trump issued Executive Order 13768, which announced that
certain federal monies would be withheld from sanctuary jurisdictions.122
The Administration sought to enforce the Order by imposing new
conditions on grants in a pre-existing program under which a statutory
formula specifies how certain funds are to be distributed to state and local
governments. Henceforth, grant recipients would be required to (1) give
federal immigration agents access to their jails for law enforcement
purposes, (2) provide federal authorities with notice of the release date of
detainees, and (3) certify compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, a statute that
prohibits state and local governments from restricting their own agencies
and employees from sharing immigration information with federal agents.
A number of jurisdictions quickly brought lawsuits challenging the new
policy. So far at least, the Administration has had little or no success in
defending its position in the courts. As Trump v. Hawaii should remind us,
that could change.123 But it shouldn’t. This enforcement policy is an
118
119
120

121

122
123

See Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities,” 59 B.C. L. REV. 1703, 1736 (2018)
(reporting that more than 500 sanctuary policies have been collected and posted online).
Id. at 1719–23.
Other justifications have included: local control over priorities and resources; avoiding unlawful
arrests and detentions; complying with equal protection norms; promoting diversity and inclusion;
and expressing opposition to federal policies. Id. at 1752–73.
Under the Criminal Alien Program, for example, which has been operating since the 1980s,
federal immigration agents are sometimes offered access to local jails in order to investigate the
inmate population for immigration violations. Similarly, local officials can be deputized as
immigration agents under a 1996 amendment to the Immigration and Nationalization Act. For a
summary of these and related programs, see id. at 1724–36.
Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
In 2016, candidate Donald Trump called for a ban on admitting Muslims into the country, a
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unconstitutional effort to use conditional grants as levers for pressuring state
officials into exercising their police power according to federal dictates.
First, the statute authorizing the grant program says nothing at all about
access to jails or notice of release dates, and the Executive should at the
very least be stopped from imposing conditions that Congress has not itself
specifically and unambiguously selected.124 The propriety of the exercise of
such discretion, which is not a settled issue, can and should be resolved by
the Supreme Court in favor of the states.125 If the Justices were to adopt a
Gregory-like clear statement rule specifically for the immigration field, this
and other sound results would easily follow.
Second, South Dakota v. Dole’s relatedness requirement should be
enforced much more strictly than it was in Dole itself. If a city applies for
money with which to purchase more police cars or train more SWAT
teams, conditions requiring the police to administer its jails according to
federal dictates should be disallowed. If Congress wants local jurisdictions
to admit its agents to their jails or notify federal agents about the pending
release of aliens subject to deportation, it should at least be required to do
so by attaching such conditions to a grant related to the operation of the
jails. Here again, a clear-statement rule like Gregory’s would assist in the
enforcement of the relatedness requirement.
Third, using a grant condition to secure compliance with Section 1373
is unconstitutional because the information-sharing statute itself violates the
anti-commandeering principle. It prevents state and local governments
from controlling decisions by their own subordinate officials and employees
about sharing information, as well as from controlling how these

124

125

proposal that was later qualified in some respects. After a clumsy initial effort to tighten border
security, President Trump eventually issued a proclamation restricting the entry of people from
eight countries (most of them with Muslim-majority populations) that his Administration deemed
insufficiently diligent in collecting and sharing information about their nationals who sought to
come to the United States. The Ninth Circuit invalidated the proclamation on the ground that it
violated two federal statutes. By a vote of 5-4, however, the Supreme Court reversed; one of the
statutory provisions at issue gave the President ample discretion to issue the proclamation, while
the other provision did not even apply to admission decisions. The Court also rejected the
plaintiffs’ claim that the proclamation violated the Establishment Clause. See Trump v. Hawaii,
138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (reversing the lower court’s grant of a preliminary injunction of President
Trump’s travel ban and remanding the case for further review). For a more detailed analysis of
the litigation, see Josh Blackman, The Travel Bans, 2018 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 29.
According to a dictum in United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950), an
unfettered right to exclude aliens from the United States “is inherent in the executive power to
control the foreign affairs of the nation.” Even if the Court were to so hold, which it has not, such
a decision would not imply that the Executive has the unilateral power to impose immigrationrelated conditions on grants to state and local governments.
Accord Va. Dep’t of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (stating that in order for
Congress to place conditions on a state’s receipt of federal funds, it must do so clearly and
unambiguously).
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subordinates use their time. It liberates state and local employees from the
laws and policy decisions by which they would otherwise be bound, and
thus effectively prevents state governments from declining to participate in
a federal regulatory program. This conflicts with the fundamental principle
on which New York v. United States, Printz, and Murphy v. NCAA are based.126
At the time of this writing, the Trump Administration’s effort to cut off
funds to “sanctuary jurisdictions” has been enjoined by several courts,127
and rightly so. If Congress is serious about enlisting reluctant state and
local governments to help enforce its immigration laws, it can do so
through grants that are closely related to the federal program, that have
unambiguous conditions attached, and that offer funding that is generous
enough to induce cooperation. One can debate the wisdom of adopting
such a policy, as well as whether it is consistent with the original meaning of
the Constitution. But if it’s permitted, there really should be no debate
about the appropriate forum for the policy debate. This is a decision for
Congress to make and, until Congress does so, the Executive has no valid
grounds for interfering with decisions by state and local governments to
refuse their cooperation.
B. Anti-Sanctuaries
Donald Trump’s campaign for the presidency relied in significant part
on appeals to voters who wanted more aggressive action to prevent illegal
immigration and to deport illegal aliens.
That may explain his
Administration’s decision to attack the sanctuary policies adopted in some
jurisdictions, but it does not justify measures that short-cut the legally

126

127

Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000), upheld a federal statute restricting the disclosure of certain
information either by private parties or by states. Unlike that statute, Section 1373 does not apply
evenhandedly to the public and private sectors. Id. at 143. Reno does appear to allude in passing
to a provision permitting, and in some cases requiring, that certain information be disclosed by
state and local governments. See Josh Blackman, Sanctuary Cities and the Constitutionality of 8 U.S.C.
1373, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Apr. 21, 2017), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2017/04/21/
sanctuary-cities-and-the-constitutionality-of-8-u-s-c-1373/ (pointing out that Reno characterizes
certain disclosures under the statute in question as mandatory). But Reno also reconciled its
decision in that case with the “principles enunciated in New York and Printz” by observing that the
statute at issue did “not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes
regulating private individuals.” 528 U.S. at 151. Under Section 1373, however, state and local
governments cannot prevent their own employees from assisting in federal law enforcement
efforts.
See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 916 F.3d 276, 288 (3d Cir. 2019)
(holding that conditions imposed on certain grants pursuant to E.O. 13768 were not authorized
by statute); New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 343 F. Supp. 3d 213, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
(enjoining enforcement of E.O. 13768 and holding Section 1373 unconstitutional); City of San
Francisco v. Sessions, 349 F. Supp. 3d 924, 973 (N.D. Cal., 2018) (same); City of Chicago v.
Sessions, 321 F. Supp. 3d 855, 879 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (same).
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appropriate means of doing so. Federalism, however, should work both
ways, and the Obama Administration erred in the other direction. One
conspicuous mistake was its attack on an Arizona law that sought to protect
the state by supplementing federal immigration enforcement efforts.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court sustained this assault by the Executive
on the state’s extremely limited effort to protect herself.
In Arizona v. United States,128 the federal government challenged four
provisions of the Arizona statute. One section made failure to comply with
federal alien-registration rules a state-law misdemeanor. The law also
made it a state misdemeanor for an illegal alien to seek or engage in work
in Arizona. A third provision authorized warrantless arrests of anyone
whom the arresting officer had probable cause to believe had committed an
offense that made the person deportable. Finally, the statute required that
officers who stopped, detained, or arrested a person must in certain
circumstances (such as when the individual does not have a driver’s license)
try to verify the person’s immigration status with the federal government.
The Obama Administration obtained a preliminary injunction against
the enforcement of all four provisions, which the Supreme Court reviewed.
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion conceded at the outset that a massive
influx of illegal aliens across the state’s southern border had produced an
epidemic of serious social problems, including crime, property damage, and
environmental problems.129 This appears to have resulted, at least in part,
from a federal decision to concentrate its enforcement resources in
California and Texas, thus funneling illegal migrants into Arizona.130 All of
the Justices agreed that the pre-enforcement injunction against the fourth
provision, which could be interpreted and enforced in ways that would not
conflict with any federal law, must be lifted. The majority, however,
concluded that the other three provisions were preempted by federal
immigration law. Three dissenting Justices wrote separate opinions, each
of which advanced somewhat different arguments.
The law of preemption is in one respect perfectly clear and in some
others very murky. Courts are indisputably required by the Supremacy
Clause to apply valid federal laws even if there are state laws to the
contrary. It is much less obvious how courts should go about deciding
whether a specific state law is preempted by a specific federal law.
Two categories of preemption are noncontroversial. Where Congress
has the authority to regulate, it may expressly preempt the states from
doing so. And where there is a conflict that makes it impossible for a
128
129
130

567 U.S. 387, 392–93 (2012).
Id. at 397–98.
Id. at 434 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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regulated party to comply with both a federal and state law, federal law
must be followed.
Two other categories developed by the courts raise more difficult
questions. Field preemption is invoked when a court concludes that
Congress has regulated a specific field so thoroughly that it presumably
would not want its regulations supplemented by any state laws. Obstacle
preemption is found when a court thinks that a state law may frustrate or
undermine the full achievement of what the court believes to be the
purpose of a federal law. Not surprisingly, field preemption and obstacle
preemption cases dominate the case law with obstacle preemption having
become particularly pervasive.131
These two statutory construction
doctrines require courts to make educated guesses about what Congress
would have said about questions that its statutes do not address, and the
applications are highly context-dependent.132 Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion in Arizona illustrates how far field preemption and obstacle
preemption can be pushed, and the disparate dissenting opinions show that
there is no consensus on an alternative approach.
The Court concluded that the new misdemeanor for violating the
federal registration statute, which provided slightly different penalties than
those found in federal law, was preempted because Congress has impliedly
occupied the field of alien registration regulations.133 The majority
emphasized the possibility that Arizona might prosecute some individuals
whom federal officers would choose not to prosecute but did not explain
why this would necessarily conflict with federal law.134
The Court also held that the provision creating a new misdemeanor for
unauthorized employment activities by aliens was barred by a federal
statute that expressly preempted states from penalizing employers for such

131

132

133
134

See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 617 (1997)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur recent cases have frequently rejected field pre-emption in the
absence of statutory language expressly requiring it.”).
Although application of the doctrine is a matter of statutory construction, the basis for
preemption lies in the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause. One might therefore think that courts
should look to the original meaning of that Clause in order to discover how statutes should be
construed. For one effort to do so, see Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 231–32
(2000) (arguing that neither obstacle preemption nor a practice of narrowly construing federal
statutes in order to avoid preemption is consistent with the original meaning of the Supremacy
Clause). Justice Thomas has adopted this view, which has been criticized as unworkable in the
modern world by at least one commentator. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 582–604 (2009)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the Court’s sweeping approach to
preemption is inconsistent with the Constitution); Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112
MICH. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2013) (discussing Justice Thomas’s textualist approach to preemption and
its influence on the Supreme Court).
Arizona, 567 U.S. at 403.
Id. at 402.
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immigration violations.135 The federal statute is silent about state penalties
on aliens who seek or accept employment, and the Court did not explain
why Congress would expressly preempt the one category and impliedly
preempt the other. Instead, the majority simply asserted that Congress had
created a balance that would be upset by the Arizona law.136
The Court also rejected Arizona’s authorization for the warrantless
arrest of individuals based on probable cause that they are eligible for
deportation.137 This, said the majority, created an obstacle to achieving
congressional purposes because it was not among the ways in which the
federal government has specifically authorized state officials to act as
immigration officers.138
Compared with the other dissenters, Justice Alito’s disagreements with
the majority were relatively limited. He agreed that the alien-registration
provision was preempted because he thought the issue had been decided in
a 1941 precedent.139 On the other hand, he disagreed with the majority on
the employment regulation, largely because he thought it should be upheld
under a 1976 precedent.140 Justice Alito could find nothing in the purposes
of the federal statutes that would be frustrated when state officials detain
criminal aliens whom the federal government itself is required by law to
take into custody, and he would therefore have upheld the warrantless
arrest provision.141
Justice Scalia’s elaborate and sharply worded dissent began by
accepting the shift from the Commerce Clause to international law and the
inherent power theory:
I accept [the extensive federal immigration law that now exists] as a
valid exercise of federal power—not because of the Naturalization Clause
(it has no necessary connection to citizenship) but because it is an inherent
attribute of sovereignty no less for the United States than for the States. As
this Court has said, it is an “accepted maxim of international law, that
every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and
essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its
dominions.” That is why there was no need to set forth control of
immigration as one of the enumerated powers of Congress . . . .142

135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142

Id. at 406.
Id.
Id. at 403.
Id.
Id. at 441 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52 (1941)).
Id. (citing DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976)).
Id. at 457.
Id. at 422 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893)).
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If the reasoning in this supposedly originalist argument were sound, it
would follow that all attributes of sovereignty that are recognized in
international law are inherent in the federal government and need not have
been enumerated in the Constitution. But the Constitution enumerates
some, and only some, of those attributes. Why some but not others, and
why these particular attributes? Rather than address this obvious question,
Justice Scalia asserted that the states have retained the sovereign
prerogative to regulate immigration except to the extent that their laws
conflict with the exercise of what he considers an inherent attribute of
sovereignty possessed by the federal government.143 But how is this more
than a bare assertion?
Instead of making an effort to interpret the text of the Constitution,
Justice Scalia maintained that the only question in the case was whether
any federal statutes unequivocally abrogated Arizona’s inherent sovereign
power over immigration, apparently because he thought that state power
over immigration is analogous to state sovereign immunity.144 In the
sovereign immunity context, however, the Court has found that abrogation
is permitted only on the basis of powers specifically granted to Congress
after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment.145 The requirement of
unequivocal abrogation in that context “arises from a recognition of the
important role played by the Eleventh Amendment and the broader
principles that it reflects.”146 There is no analogous textual basis for Scalia’s
inherent-sovereignty theory. Practically everything governments do can be
conceptualized as a manifestation of an inherent attribute of sovereignty,
which does nothing to determine whether a given power was given
exclusively or concurrently to Congress or left entirely with the states.
Justice Scalia treats authority over immigration as a concurrent power and
says that Congress must unequivocally express a determination to abrogate
the states’ power to control immigration.147 Justice Scalia’s novel theory
about concurrent inherent powers is little more than an ipse dixit, and so is
his demand for a rule requiring what he calls unequivocal abrogation.
For Justice Thomas, this case required only a straightforward
application of his understanding of the original meaning of the Supremacy
Clause, which he had adopted outside the immigration context several
years earlier.148 In his view, the Constitution limits preemption to cases
where the ordinary meaning of the texts of a federal and state law conflict
143
144
145
146
147
148

Id. at 422.
Id. at 423 (citing Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996)).
See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55–56.
Arizona, 567 U.S. at 423 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 437 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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with each other.149 Under that rule, none of the four Arizona provisions
were preempted, whether or not there was any tension with purposes that
might be attributed to the federal immigration statutes.150
Justice Thomas’s understanding of the Supremacy Clause would go a
long way toward protecting the states from inappropriate federal intrusions
on their regulatory authority over aliens. But because his theory sweeps far
beyond the immigration context, it has implications that will make its
adoption by the Court unlikely.
Justice Scalia’s approach would have effects similar to Justice Thomas’s
in the immigration context, but his adoption of the inherent power theory
renders his position untethered to the original meaning of the Constitution.
That, in turn, means that the rule he adopts is unlikely to appeal to those
who think originalism requires arguments and evidence about original
meaning rather than ipse dixits.151
Justice Alito’s approach, with its reliance on his interpretation of the
Court’s precedents, would tend to continue producing the kind of
fluctuating results that have been observed since the Court left the original
meaning of the Constitution behind. At several points, Alito invokes
precedents requiring that courts find a “clear and manifest” purpose to
preempt in areas traditionally regulated by the states.152 If a majority of
Justices took such a rule seriously, as Justice Alito did in this case, the effect
might be comparable to what we could expect from Justice Thomas’s
approach. As Justice Kennedy’s opinion vividly demonstrates, however, it
is very easy for judges to find that something is clear and manifest on the
basis of little or no evidence.153 The Gregory canon would be more difficult
to evade, both in the Supreme Court and in the lower courts, and is
therefore superior to Justice Alito’s approach.
Gregory also shows how a majority of Justices might agree on a way to
reduce the damage to federalism arising from the inherent power theory.
The first step would be for the Court to acknowledge that this theory is
extremely dubious, even though it is so well-settled that judicial prudence
149
150
151

152
153

Id.
Id. at 440.
For additional examples of Scalia’s unsatisfying efforts to reconcile originalism with the
acceptance of unconstitutional precedents, see Craig S. Lerner, Justice Scalia’s Eighth Amendment
Jurisprudence: The Failure of Sake-of-Argument Originalism, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 91 (2019);
Nelson Lund, Antonin Scalia and the Dilemma of Constitutional Originalism, 48 PERSPS. ON POL. SCI. 7,
10–11 (2018).
See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 441, 451–53, 459 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(referring to the “clear and manifest” language from DeCanas).
The majority opinion itself recites the “clear and manifest” purpose requirement, which had no
discernable constraining effect on the Court’s analysis. See id. 567 U.S. at 400 (citing the “clear
and manifest” language from Rice and Wyeth).
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may counsel against its repudiation. The Court could then adopt Gregory’s
canon of construction, which accomplishes what is most needed in the
immigration area: the prevention of inadvertent congressional
infringements on state prerogatives as well as unauthorized infringements
carried out by executive agencies and judges acting in the name of
Congress. When the Constitution has been construed to strip from the
states their legal protection against intrusive exercises of congressional
power, the Court “must be absolutely certain that Congress intended such
an exercise” before interpreting a statute to do so.154 In other words, “it
must be plain to anyone reading” the federal statute that it preempts state
law.155
Gregory was a 5-4 decision made possible when Justice Souter replaced
Justice Brennan, who had been a member of the 5-4 majority in Garcia.
Arizona v. United States was a 5-3 decision in a case from which Justice Kagan
was recused. If we assume that she would likely have voted with the
majority, Justice Kennedy’s resignation means that the Court may be only
one more retirement away from having five Justices who would be willing
to apply the Gregory canon in the immigration area. If that were to happen,
the Supreme Court could visibly treat contentious issues like sanctuary
policies and state efforts to reduce the social costs of illegal immigration
with an even hand.
In light of the intensity that has come to permeate the political debates
about immigration, the appeal of such visible evenhandedness might even
persuade Chief Justice Roberts that the Arizona approach is not in the long
run interest of the Court as an institution. He seems to be extremely
touchy about the Court’s political reputation, which is not surprising in the
leader of what will be known to history as the Roberts Court. It is not
inconceivable that he might be persuaded that the Gregory approach would
offer more protection for the Court’s reputation than the ferocious
disregard for state interests in the Arizona majority opinion. So perhaps the
Court need not even wait for another retirement.
CONCLUSION
The Constitution sets forth a pretty clear allocation of power over
immigration between the state and federal governments. The Foreign
Commerce Clause empowers Congress to exclude aliens from the United
States as it sees fit, to expel those who violate exclusion laws, and to enact
uniform naturalization laws. The states retain a residual authority to
154
155

Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991).
Id. at 467.
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regulate aliens who reside within their borders and to expel unwanted
aliens from their own territory.
The Supreme Court has rejected the Constitution’s allocation of power
in favor of a judicially invented theory that attributes to the federal
government a very broad inherent authority over aliens. This doctrine is
almost certainly so well-settled that the Court will cling to it no matter how
problematic it is as an interpretation of the Constitution and no matter how
many practical problems it creates.
The Court has faced a similar problem arising from its latitudinarian
interpretation of the Interstate Commerce Clause. In that context, the
Justices have developed several ameliorative doctrines, including the anticommandeering principle of New York v. United States and its progeny, as well
as the clear-statement rule of Gregory v. Ashcroft. The same doctrines can and
should be applied in the immigration area.
The anti-commandeering doctrine should and likely will be used to
blunt the Trump Administration’s efforts to force state and local
governments to assist in the enforcement of federal immigration laws.
Unfortunately, the Court has already established an important precedent,
Arizona v. United States, that unnecessarily and inappropriately interprets
existing statutes to preempt the states from protecting their own interests in
the face of federal underenforcement of the immigration laws. That
approach should be repudiated and replaced with a clear-statement rule
that allows the states to reinforce federal law enforcement unless they are
forbidden to do so by an express or absolutely unambiguous statutory
command.

